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2

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

Case No. 960234-CA

:

VAO BOYD HUNSAKER,

:

De f endant/Appe11ant.

Priority No. 10

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from sentencing on a plea in abeyance for
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, a violation of Utah Code
Annotated Section 76-5-103, in the First Judicial District Court in
and for Box Elder County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ben H.
Hadfield, presiding.
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Was the imposition of the conditions imposed in this case

a final order?
2.

Did the trial court err in imposing the conditions of an

indeterminate jail term up to one year, and a fine, on a plea in
abeyance, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 77-2a-l et.
seq (1953 as amended)?
Standard of Review: A trial court's legal conclusions will be

1

reversed only if shown to be clearly erroneous. State v. Deli. 861
P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993).
A trial courtfs interpretation of a statute is a question of
law that is reviewed for correctness, with no deference accorded to
the

trial

court's

interpretation.

legal

conclusions

arising

from

its

State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993) .

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
The

Appellant

provisions,

identifies

statutes,

the

ordinances

and

following
rules

as

constitutional
those

"whose

interpretation is determinative" within the meaning of Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 24(a) (6) :
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-2a-l et. seq.:
77-2a-l. Definitions.
For the purposes of this chapter:
(1) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court,
upon motion of the prosecution and the defendant,
accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from
the defendant but not, at that time, entering
judgment of conviction against him nor imposing
sentence upon him on condition that he comply with
specific conditions as set forth in a plea in
abeyance agreement.
(2) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement
entered into between the prosecution and the
defendant setting forth the specific terms and
conditions upon which, following acceptance of the
agreement by the court, a plea may be held in
abeyance.
77-2a-2. Plea in abeyance agreement -- Negotiation -Contents -- Terms of agreement -- Waiver of time for
sentencing.
(1) At any time after acceptance of a plea of
guilty or no contest but prior to entry of judgment
of conviction and imposition of sentence, the court
may, upon motion of both the prosecuting attorney
and the defendant, hold the plea in abeyance and
2

not enter judgment of conviction against the
defendant nor impose sentence upon the defendant
within the time periods contained in Rule 22(a),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(2) The defendant shall be represented by counsel
during negotiations for a plea in abeyance and at
the time of acknowledgment and affirmation of any
plea in abeyance agreement unless the defendant
shall have knowingly and intelligently waived his
right to counsel.
(3) The defendant has the right to be represented
by counsel at any court hearing relating to a plea
in abeyance agreement.
(4)(a) Any plea in abeyance agreement entered into
between the prosecution and the defendant and
approved by the court shall include a full,
detailed
recitation
of
the requirements
and
conditions agreed to by the defendant and the
reason for requesting the court to hold the plea in
abeyance.
(b) If the plea is to a felony or any
combination of misdemeanors and felonies, the
agreement shall be in writing and shall, prior to
acceptance by the court, be executed by the
prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and the
defendant' s counsel in the presence of the court.
(5) A plea shall not be held in abeyance for a
period longer than 18 months if the plea was to any
class of misdemeanor or longer than three years if
the plea was to any degree of felony or to any
combination of misdemeanors and felonies.
(6) A plea in abeyance agreement shall not be
approved unless the defendant, before the court,
and
any
written
agreement,
knowingly
and
intelligently waives
time
for sentencing
as
designated in Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Manner of entry of plea -- Powers of court.
(1) Acceptance of any plea in anticipation of a
plea in abeyance agreement shall be done in full
compliance with the provisions of Rule 11, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(2) A plea in abeyance agreement may provide that
the court may, upon finding that the defendant has
successfully completed the terms of the agreement:
(a) reduce the degree of the offense and enter
judgment of conviction and impose sentence for
a lower degree of offense; or
(b) allow withdrawal of defendant' s plea and
order the dismissal of the case.

1

(3) Upon finding that a defendant has successfully
completed the terms of a plea in abeyance
agreement, the court shall reduce the degree of the
offense, dismiss the case only as provided in the
plea in abeyance agreement or as agreed to by all
parties.
Upon sentencing a defendant for any
lesser offense pursuant to plea in abeyance
agreement, the court may not invoke Section 76-3402 to further reduce the degree of the offense.
(4) The court may require the Department of
Corrections to assist in the administration of the
plea in abeyance agreement as if the defendant were
on probation to the court under Section 77-18-1.
(5) The court may upon acceptance of a plea in
abeyance agreement and pursuant to the terms of the
agreement:
(a) order the defendant to pay a nonrefundable
plea in abeyance fee, which shall be allocated
in the same manner as if it had been paid as a
fine and shall not exceed in amount the
maximum fine which could have been imposed
upon conviction and sentencing for the same
offense;
(b) order the defendant to pay all or a
portion of the costs of administration of the
agreement;
(c)
order
the
defendant
to
pay
full
restitution to the victims of his actions as
provided in Section 76-3-201;
(d) order the defendant to pay the costs of
any rehabilitative program required by the
terms of the agreement; and
(e) order the defendant to comply with any
other conditions which could have been imposed
as conditions of probation upon conviction and
sentencing for the same offense.
(6) A court may not hold a plea in abeyance without
the consent of both the prosecuting attorney and
the defendant.
A decision by a prosecuting
attorney not to agree to a plea in abeyance is not
subject to judicial review.
(7) No plea may be held in abeyance in any case
involving a sexual offense against a victim who is
under the age of 14.
Violation of plea in abeyance agreement -- Hearing
-- Entry of judgment and imposition of sentence -Subsequent prosecutions.
(1) If, at any time during the term of the plea in
abeyance agreement, information comes to the
attention of the prosecuting attorney or the court

k

that the defendant has violated any condition of
the agreement, the court, at the request of the
prosecuting attorney, made by appropriate motion
and affidavit, or upon its own motion, may issue an
order requiring the defendant to appear before the
court at a designated time and place to show cause
why the court should not find the terms of the
agreement to have been violated and why the
agreement should not be terminated. If, following
an evidentiary hearing, the court finds that the
defendant has failed to substantially comply with
any term or condition of the plea in abeyance
agreement, it may terminate the agreement and enter
judgment of conviction and impose sentence against
the defendant for the offense to which the original
plea was entered.
Upon entry of judgment of
conviction and imposition of sentence, any amounts
paid by the defendant as a plea in abeyance fee
prior to termination of the agreement shall be
credit against any fine imposed by the court.
(2) The termination of a plea in abeyance agreement
and subsequent entry of judgment of conviction and
imposition of
sentence
shall not bar any
independent prosecution arising from any offense
that constituted a violation of any term or
condition of an agreement whereby the original plea
was placed in abeyance.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
An

information was

filed on 12 December

defendant with aggravated assault.

1995, charging

On 29 January 1996, defendant

entered into a plea in abeyance agreement, pleading guilty to the
charge.

On 26 February 1996, defendant was sentenced, or, as the

State would characterize it, "further conditions were imposed."
Two of those conditions were: 1) a fine and surcharge in the amount
of $925.00; and 2) an indeterminate term of imprisonment up to one
year.
On or about 21 March 1996, defendant filed a Notice of Appeal.
On 17 April 1996, the Utah Court of Appeals filed a Sua Sponte
Motion for Summary Disposition.

Both the defendant and the State

5

responded by memorandum to the motion, and on 11 June 1996, the
Court denied the motion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about 6 December 1995, the defendant appeared at the
victim1 s residence in an intoxicated state. He apparently knocked
on the door of the residence and a woman answered.

Defendant

indicated that he thought he had left some knives that belonged to
him at the residence.

A single knife was produced and given to

defendant, but he indicated that he thought there were more knives.
Defendant then opened the blade of the knife he had and made some
threatening comments to the woman, though he did not touch or harm
the woman.

(Change of Plea Hearing, 29 January 1996, p. 6). x
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This court has jurisdiction in this case because there was a
signed order and it was final. The trial judge signed a Judgment
and Order on Plea Held in Abeyance.

This order incorporated the

terms later imposed by the trial court.

The order was final

because the particular proceeding was terminated by the trial
court's judgment, the ruling specified with certainty a final
determination of the rights of the parties, and the ruling was
susceptible of enforcement.
The "conditions imposed" in this case were tantamount to
sentencing, as the trial court imposed a fine and incarceration,
neither of which is allowed under the plea in abeyance statute

1

This transcript was not paginated as part of the record.
Hence, the citation differs from the others.

£

because they constitute sentencing. The trial court's position was
that if the defendant only got the benefit of no judgment of
conviction, that is sufficient. The legislature, however, intended
defendants to have two benefits under a plea in abeyance agreement:
1) no judgment of conviction, and 2) no imposition of sentencing.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION BECAUSE
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS FINAL
A.

THERE IS A SIGNED ORDER.
The trial judge signed a Judgment and Order on Plea Held in

Abeyance.

(R. at 29).

The State concedes as much.

(See State's

Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Summary Dismissal, at 2:
"Since filing its memorandum on 24 April 1996, the State has
learned that a Judgment and Order on Plea Held in Abeyance was
entered in this case on 27 February 1996.")

While that order did

not, in the document itself, state the terms of the conditions
imposed, paragraph

8 incorporated

the terms the trial court

imposed, as the State has also conceded. Id.
The State contends, however, that the order is not final
because the defendant was not sentenced. Articulating the issue in
this manner, for this Court to determine whether or not the order
was final it must determine whether or not defendant was sentenced.
In other words, this Court must determine the substantive issue in
order to decide the procedural question of whether or not it has
jurisdiction, as circular as that may seem.

7

B.

THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS FINAL.
The Utah Supreme Court stated long ago: "Of course, if this

court determines that a judgment is final, it is, as far as the
right of appeal is concerned, final, whether final or not."
Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 73 p.2d 1277, 1288 (Utah 1937)(Cited
in footnote of Cannon v. Keller, 692 P.2d 740, n. 1 (Utah 1984).2
The Court in Pomeroy further stated:
The test of finality for the purpose of
appeal, therefore, is not necessarily whether
the whole matter involved in the action is
concluded,
but
whether
the
particular

proceeding
judgment.

or

action

is

Pomeroy at 1290. (Italics original).

terminated

by

the

The State may contend that

the order on the plea in abeyance did not conclude the "whole
matter involved," and is therefore not "final". In other words, if
the defendant failed to abide by the conditions of the plea in
abeyance, judgment would be entered and the defendant could be
sentenced to prison. The State's position is most likely that, at
that point, the "whole matter involved" would be concluded, and
therefore "final". As the Utah Supreme Court has noted, however,
the whole matter need not be concluded for there to be a final
j udgment.

2

That footnote states: "[a]1though not designated an
"order or "Judgment,! the ruling specifies with certainty a
final determination of the rights of the parties and is
susceptible of enforcement. Further, it orders the issuance of a
writ and is clear as to the party against whom it is issued. We
therefore have jurisdiction over this appeal, it being from a
final judgment or order." See also Ellinwood v. Bennion, 276 P.
159, 160 (Utah 1929) .
1

£

Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized
that in appropriate circumstances, [even] a signed minute
entry may be a final order for purposes of appeal.
However, such treatment is appropriate only when "the
ruling specifies with certainty a final determination of
the rights of the parties and is susceptible of
enforcement.!
Swenson

v.

State,

889

P.2d

original) (citations omitted) .

415

(Utah

1994)(emphasis

What we have here is much more

substantial than a minute entry--it is a signed order.

The issue

in this case revolves around several considerations: 1) whether the
particular proceeding was terminated by the trial court's judgment;
2)

whether

the

ruling

specifies

with

certainty

a

final

determination of the rights of the parties; and 3) whether the
ruling is susceptible of enforcement. See Cannon v. Keller, supra.
1.

THE PARTICULAR PROCEEDING WAS TERMINATED BY THE TRIAL
COURT'S JUDGMENT.

The

"particular proceeding"

here was

the

imposition of

conditions under the plea in abeyance agreement.

A hearing was

held on 26 February 1996 at which conditions were imposed upon the
defendant pursuant to the plea in abeyance agreement (though the
defendant asserts that the proceedings would be more accurately
characterized as "sentencing.") No further hearings were scheduled
or pending to impose conditions under the agreement.

While it!s

true that if the defendant fails to abide by the conditions of the
plea in abeyance agreement there would be further proceedings to
enter judgment and impose sentence, the defendant's position is
that those proceedings would not be pursuant to the plea in
abeyance agreement (as it would be terminated pursuant to Section

1

77-2a-4(l) U.C.A.), but rather pursuant to his guilty plea.

In

other words, those proceedings would be separate, and not a part of
the "particular proceeding" which dealt with "imposing conditions"
upon the defendant.

At the time the trial judge signed the order

on the plea held in abeyance, the "particular proceeding" at issue
was terminated.
2.

THE RULING SPECIFIED WITH CERTAINTY A FINAL DETERMINATION
OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES.

The

trial court's

ruling

in this matter

specified with

certainty a final determination concerning the defendant's right to
remain

free

agreement.

from

incarceration

under

the

plea

in

abeyance

There can be no question that the defendant was

sentenced to spend additional time incarcerated. The State argued
in its Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Summary Dismissal that
the jail time was "diluted" because it allowed defendant to get out
of jail as soon as he was accepted into a program.

This argument

admits, however, that jail time was imposed, however "diluted" it
may be.

Notwithstanding, the plea in abeyance statute doesn't

allow for even "diluted" jail time to be imposed.
Under the circumstances, the defendant spent more time in jail
after the conclusion of the hearing of 26 February 1996.
unreasonable
inpatient

to believe

treatment

that the defendant

program,

get

could

accepted,

It is

contact an

and

arrange

transportation to the facility on the same day as his sentencing.
The only conclusion to be drawn is that the defendant spent more
time incarcerated before entering a treatment program.

(Moreover,

there was no evidence that the defendant would in fact be accepted

into an inpatient treatment program, and no evidence that he could
afford one.)
The court's ruling also specified with certainty a final
determination of other rights.

For example, the defendant was

sentenced to pay a fine and surcharge in the amount of $925.00.
The fine was not suspended (as is sometimes the case); defendant
was ordered to pay it. At that point, he no longer had a right to
be free from paying the fine imposed, which is precluded under
Section 77-2a-3(5)(a).
The defendant was also ordered to do the following:
1.

enter into inpatient treatment

2.

take Antabuse

3.

attend AA meetings at least once a week

4.

not possess or consume alcohol or drugs

5.

not frequent any place where alcohol is the main item on

the menu
6.

submit to random testing of his bodily fluids and/or

breath
7.

submit to random search and seizure of his personal

property by any law enforcement officer
8.

obtain and maintain lawful, verifiable employment

9.

enter into a standard probation agreement.

These all affected defendant's rights.
3.

THE RULING WAS SUSCEPTIBLE OF ENFORCEMENT.

At the time of sentencing defendant had already spent 82 days
in jail.

(R. at 46 line 2).

The court ordered defendant to serve
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up to one year in jail, and ordered that he be allowed to enter
into an inpatient treatment program as soon as he was accepted.
The defendant obviously spent more time in jail until he was
accepted

into

occurred).

a

treatment

program

(if, in

fact,

that

ever

As argued above, it is unreasonable to believe that

defendant could have contacted an inpatient treatment program on
the day of sentencing, got accepted and transported to that
facility on the same day.

The only logical conclusion is that

defendant spent more time in jail before going to a treatment
program.

The only way for the trial court to avoid violating the

plea in abeyance statute would have been to order the defendant' s
release from custody pending his acceptance and entry into an
inpatient treatment program.
Based on the above considerations, at the time the trial court
sentenced (or "imposed the conditions on") the defendant, and those
conditions were enforced, the matter became final in the most
literal sense of the word, especially regarding the imposition of
additional jail time--once defendant spent any time in jail, the
clock could not be turned back and those actions undone: they were
final.
C.

IF THIS COURT DETERMINES THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER
WAS NOT FINAL, THEN THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE TREATED AS AN
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL.
This is a very unique case which the interests of justice

demand be reviewed by this Court.

If this Court determines that

the order was not final, the defendant does not have the option of
then filing a petition for permission to file an interlocutory

12

appeal because the Notice of Appeal was not filed within 20 days
after entry of judgment, as required by Rule 5, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

Subsection (e) of that rule states that:

An appeal from an interlocutory order may be granted only if
it appears that the order involves substantial rights and may
materially affect the final decision or that a determination
of the correctness of the order before final judgment will
better serve the administration and interests of justice.
(Emphasis added).

The interests of justice will not be served if

this Court does not take the opportunity to rule on the correctness
of the trial court's order.
POINT II
THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED IN THIS CASE
WERE TANTAMOUNT TO SENTENCING, IN
VIOLATION OP THE PLEA IN ABEYANCE STATUTE
Because resolution of the issues in this case depends on how
the plea in abeyance statute is interpreted, some guidance will be
helpful.

This Court has stated that when interpreting part of a

statute, it should be construed in light of the purpose of the
statute as a whole.
App. 1995).

State v. Scieszka. 897 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Utah

The Utah Supreme Court has stated:

"When faced with

a question of statutory construction, we look first to the plain
language of the statute." Carlie v. Morgan. 293 Utah Adv. Rep. 22,
23 (Utah June 25, 1996) (citations omitted) .

The courts have a

"fundamental duty to give effect, if possible, to every word of the
statute." Isi. at 24 (Citation omitted) (Emphasis added) . In State
v. One 1984 Qldsmobile. 261 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5 (Utah March 24,
1995), the Utah Supreme Court stated that in interpreting a
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particular statute,
we first look to the plain language of the statute. In
construing a statute, we assume that "each term in the
statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are
read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably
confused or inoperable."
(Citations omitted).

We are further instructed that if the

legislature's intent of any particular portion of a statute is not
readily apparent, those portions should be read in the context of
the statute as a whole.
24.

Carlie v. Morgan, 293 Utah Adv. Rep. at

Therefore, section 77-2a-3 (5) (e) should be read in the

context of the plea in abeyance statute as a whole.
The easiest way to understand the intent of the plea in
abeyance statute as a whole is to read the "Definitions" section,
which articulates the purpose of the statute. It reads as follows:
For the purposes of this chapter:
(1) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court,
upon motion of the prosecution and the defendant,
accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from
the defendant but not, at that time, entering
judgment of conviction against him nor imposing
sentence upon him on condition that he comply with
specific conditions as set forth in a plea in
abeyance agreement.
(Emphasis added).

Clearly there is to be no sentence imposed.

This language appears to be plain on its face. To understand what
the legislature intended the word "sentence" to mean, we need only
read the statute further.

Specifically, we111 focus on whether

under this statute a fine and incarceration constitute a sentence.
A.

A FINE CONSTITUTES A "SENTENCE."
The question of whether a fine constitutes a "sentence" can

easily be answered by reading Section 77-2a-3(5)(a).
14

(5) The court may upon acceptance of a plea in abeyance
agreement and pursuant to the terms of the agreement:
(a) order the defendant to pay a nonrefundable plea
in abeyance fee, which shall be allocated in the
same manner as if it had been paid as a fine and
shall not exceed in amount the maximum fine which
could have been imposed upon conviction and
sentencing for the same offense;
(Emphasis added).

The wording of this subsection plainly shows

that a fine cannot be imposed under a plea in abeyance agreement,
but could be if a defendant were convicted and sentenced.

The

intent of the legislature is that, under this statute, a fine
constitutes a "sentence."
B.

THE IMPOSITION OF JAIL TIME CONSTITUTES A "SENTENCE."
The

question

of

whether

the

imposition

of

jail

time

constitutes a sentence is also easily answered. Section 77-2a-3(5)
and its subparts enumerate what trial courts may do under a plea in
abeyance agreement.

Nowhere is there any indication that the

imposition of jail time is allowable under the statute, at least
nowhere outside of the ambiguous subsection (5) (e) .

It is not

reasonable to accept the notion that imposing a fine constitutes a
"sentence", while imposing jail time does not.

Of the two

"conditions," certainly jail time is the harsher, and it is
unreasonable to argue that the legislature intended for the courts
to be allowed to impose jail time on a plea in abeyance.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Carlie v. Morgan, refused to read
particular sections of the statute at issue in isolation from the
rest of the statute.

That should be done in this case, as well.

Section 77-2a-3(5) (e) , when read alone, does indeed appear to give
the trial courts power to impose any conditions.
15

However, when

read in the context of the entire statute, section 77-2a-3(5)(e)
cannot be interpreted to mean what the prosecution and trial court
would have it mean.

The Statefs and trial court!s reading of

subsection (5)(e) render it unreasonably confused and inoperable.
We must assume that the legislature used the term "sentence"
advisedly and intended it to be understood literally.
C.

THE STATE'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 77-2a-3(5)(e) IS
UNREASONABLE
If, as the State contended below, a trial court can indeed

"order the defendant to comply with any other conditions which
could have been imposed as conditions of probation upon conviction
and sentencing for the same offense," then the phrase "nor impos [e]
sentence upon him" is rendered absolutely meaningless. Indeed, it
seems odd for the legislature to enumerate, in Section 77-2a-3(5)
and its subparts, what the trial court can do, then throw in a
clause that purports to give the trial court carte blanche to
impose any conditions it wants to.
court's powers under a plea in
do anything it wants to?

Why enumerate any of the trial

abeyance if the court can in fact

If the legislature truly intended for

the trial courts1 powers to be so broad, it could and would have
simply used subsection

(e) of 77-2a-3(5) U.C.A. and foregone

inclusion of the other enumerated powers. Indeed, one may ask why
even have a statute governing pleas in abeyance if they're no
different than any other case.

lfi

D.

THE INTENT OF THE PLEA IN ABEYANCE STATUTE IS THAT
DEFENDANTS WHO ABIDE BY CONDITIONS IMPOSED OBTAIN
TWO BENEFITS.
Clearly the intent of the plea in abeyance statute is that a

defendant who enters into a plea in abeyance agreement, and abides
by the conditions imposed thereby, obtains two benefits: 1) no
conviction, and 2) no sentencing.

The trial court in this case

apparently didn't understand it that way, as it expressed the
opinion that a defendant who gets only the benefit of no conviction
(but is sentenced) still has an incentive to enter into a plea in
abeyance agreement.
record.

"When itfs all over he can come away with no

There is still an obvious incentive or benefit."

44 line 14-16).

(R. at

The prosecuting attorney agreed:

As far as the plea in abeyance, itfs always
been my feeling and position, Your Honor, that
the key to that is the fact that the defendant
in fact can go through the system, carry out
what would be a probation and come away with
no record. To me that is the benefit intended
to be conferred by the legislature. I see no
reason why this court cannot impose any
restrictions it wants to impose as a condition
of probation.
(R. at 45 line 12-20).

Anyone who takes an objective look at the

plea in abeyance statute can see why the court cannot impose any
restrictions

it

wants.

The legislative intent of the statute is

clear, and it is also clear that what the trial court did in this
case is not in accord with that intent.

In fact, it appears that

the trial judge was not even aware that a statute governing plea in
abeyance agreements exists.
One would think that a trial judge would either be familiar
with a statute governing a proceeding he's involved in, or at least
17

have the statute in front of him for reference, especially in a
case in which the central issue has been disputed before with
particular
neither.

judge.

that

The trial judge in this case had obviously done

For example, at the sentencing hearing, the judge asked

defense counsel for the statutory reference to the plea in abeyance
statute (R. at 39 line 18) , despite the fact that the judge and
defense counsel had "gone the rounds on the plea in abeyance issue
before".

(R. at 38 line 18-20).

The trial judgefs lack of understanding of the applicable
statute is evidenced further by other remarks in the proceedings
below:
THE COURT: Do you understand that I haven't made any
agreement or any decision as to what sentence I would impose?
(1/29/96 Plea Hearing at 8 line 15-17)(Emphasis added).
•

*

*

THE COURT: . . . The Court has received and reviewed a
presentence investigation report. The defendant is before the
court for sentencing pursuant to his guilty plea . . . .
(R. at 37 line 4-7)(Emphasis added).
•

*

*

THE COURT: . . . If 11 require that he pay a fine and
surcharge in the amount of $925.
MR. BOUWHUIS: Excuse me.
Would that be more
appropriately termed an administrative fee? Let me -- well, that' s
fine.
THE COURT: Ifm not sure where you're going with that.
(R. at 46 line 15-21) (Emphasis added) .
•

*

*

THE COURT: You will owe the fine. . . .
(R. at 48 line 14)(Emphasis added).
The trial court repeatedly referred to the proceeding as a

1&

"sentencing" and also imposed a "fine", which the statute does not
allow.
The statute makes it clear that a fine could only be imposed
"upon conviction and sentencing" and not pursuant to a plea in
abeyance agreement. As we see from Section 77-2a-l, there is to be
neither conviction nor sentencing under a plea

in abeyance;

therefore, any fine imposed is in violation of this statute.
CONCLUSION
By assessing a fine and incarcerating the defendant, the trial
court imposed sentence upon the him, despite the court carefully
calling it "imposition of conditions" at the sentencing hearing.
This is clearly a violation of the plea in abeyance statute, with
which the trial court did not take the time to familiarize itself.
The legislative intent of the plea in abeyance statute is that the
defendant, if he abides by the conditions of the plea in abeyance,
obtains two benefits: 1) no judgment of conviction, and 2) no
sentence. Of this there can be no question. There can also be no
question that, no matter what the trial court called it, the
defendant was sentenced.
Wherefore, defendant respectfully prays that this Court will
remand his case so that conditions may be imposed appropriately
under the plea in abeyance statute.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ 2 - day of October 1996.

-"" MICHAELD. B0UWHUT5
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered a copy of the foregoing via
U.S. mail, with postage prepaid, to J. Frederic Voros, Jr.,
Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, SLC UT 84114, this
~7 day of October 1996.

0,A.

MICHAEL D. BOUWHUIS
Attorney for Defendant
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ADDENDUM A

1/29/96 Plea
MR.

Hearing

HUNSAKER:

THE COURT:
required,

I

do.

If you meet

all of the terms that

then that won't happen.

MR. HUNSAKER:
THE COURT:
the advice of

Are you satisfied

Y e s , Your

Do you need

with

Honor.
any more

attorney or to think

MR. HUNSAKER:
THE COURT:

about

this?

Have there been any promises made..

than what has been stated

plead

gui1ty ?
MR. HUNSAKER:
THE COURT:

time to confer

No, sir.

other

would

clear?

counsel?

THE COURT:

any agreement

Is that also

are

Yes, sir.

All right.

MR. HUNSAKER:

with your

Yes,

No, Your

here, to cause you to

Honor.

Do you understand

or any decision

that I haven't

made

as to what sentence I

impos e ?
MR. HUNSAKER:

Y e s , I understand

that, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:
or coercion

Has anyone

to cause you

MR. HUNSAKER:
THE COURT:

used

to plead

any force or duress
guilty?

No.

Are you pleading guilty because

areinfactguilty?
MR. HUNSAKER:

No.

you

1 ;

THE CLERK:

2 i v s . Vao Boyd
3 :

Case number

Hunsaker.

THE C O U R T :

4 i defendant

9 5 1 0 0 0 1 4 0 , State of Utah

The record

is present

should

along with

reflect

that

his counsel.

the

The

J
j

5

court has received
investigation
court

and reviewed

report.

The defendant

for sentencing pursuant

8 j aggravated
!

10 | to review

a presentence
is before

the

to his guilty plea

to

assault, a third degree felony.
Mr. B o u w h u i s , have you had an opportunity
this report with your

client?

!

11 |

MR. B O U W H U I S :

Well,

I've

had

the opportunity

to

i
1 2 : review
j
1 3 ' Fridav

it and

a copy off

to Mr. Hunsaker.

any questions

14

I dropped

on the

at the

He indicates

jail on

he doesn't

have

report.

15

THE COURT:

Mr. Hunsaker,

16 I I'll

pass and go to another

if you want more

case and

time

let you have an

i
17 i opportunity

to visit with Mr. B o u w h u i s .

If you

want

i

18 I to go ahead

and proceed, we'll proceed

19

MR. HUNSAKER:

20

THE C O U R T :

21

MR. BUNDERSON:

22

with conditions?

23

indi cate.

Let's go

now.

ahead.

All r i g h t .
Isn't

this a plea

That's what our

24

MR. B O U W H U I S :

25

THE COURT:

It is

Just a moment

in

abeyance

file seems

to

(Pause in the
MR. BUNDERSON:
but in looking
here

The report doesn't mention

at the file the first

is a m o t i o n , agreement

abeyance.

I assume

THE C O U R T :

apparently

it,

thing I have in

and order for plea in

that's what we're doing

today.

Based on the representations

counsel, this does appear
agreement .

proceedings.)

to be a plea

I note for the record
is in microfilming.

of

in abeyance

that the

agreement

It's not here in front

of me .
MR. BUNDERSON:
just a standard
a period

For the court's

agreement.

of 36 m o n t h s .

further

The plea

The

at the end of 36 m o n t h s .

benefit, it's

charge

is to be held

is to be

It was sent

from you at this

All right.

to AP&P

Mr. Bouwhuis, I'll

Thank you, Your Honor.

is well aware, since we've kind of gone
the plea

in abeyance

Mr. Caine

addressed

that

The

court

the rounds on

in the sentencing

I don't want

too much, but for the record

that pleas

hear

issue before, on our position.

just previously.

77-2a-l.

for

time.

MR. B O U W H U I S :

point

dismissed

c o n d i t i o n s , if any.

THE C O U R T :

held

for

in abeyance

are governed

that was

to belabor

the

would point out
by

section

1 ;

On a previous

2 i court that I think
3

viewed

4

think

5

in light -- w e l l ,

6

ambiguous.

case I pointed

out to the

it b e s t , when this statute

in a light most

favorable

at best the statute
from

is

to the prosecution, I"

is ambiguous.

any perspective,

When

viewed

it's

Our p o s i t i o n . Your Honor, is that

7
8

first subsection

9

It states

that

of 77-2a-l defines pleas in abeyance.

the court

10

conviction

nor impose

11

statute goes on to say

12 j in abeyance

the

entails.

is to not enter a judgment

sentence.

Of course,

in detail

of

the

exactly what a plea

77-2a-3 , sub five, does

state

i

i

13 j what the court can do.

i
14,'

I think what

15 ; asking

the court

the State would

to follow

the

rely upon in

recommendations,

i

16 ! specifically

with reference

17 j is subsection

to serving

the jail

time,

E.

]

18 |

THE COURT:

19

MR. BOUWHUIS:

2 0 i what

I'm

21 •

THE COURT:

going

Can you give me that citation
7 7 - 2 a - 3 , subsection

to refer

again?

five, sub E is

to.

Okay.

i

!

i

22 j

MR. BOUWHUIS:

I believe

that would

be

the

i

23 ; subsection that the State would rely on in urging
court to follow the recommendation for iail.
The
24
25 I court may order

the defendant

to comply

with any

the

other

1

! the

court?

i

MR.
that

to

HUNSAKER:
light

provisions
\ c^T.es

5

in

to

of

the

the

pretty

I

appreciate
court,

plea

close

in
to

Mr.

because

when

abeyance,
the

top

Bouwhuis

as

of

I

he

the

bringing

read

the

said,

it

first

i
!

6
7

p a r a g r a p h or t w o .
I l i k e t h a t i d e a , t h a t if I d i d n ' t
j nu* s s u p o n m y p r o b a t i o n I w o u l d n ' t b e s e n t e n c e d
as

i
I ov.ilty

S

unless

3 j interpreted
|
j

0

THE

I

it

messed

up

on

my

probation,

is

what

I

myself.

COURT:

Anything

from

the

State?

i

1 j

MR. BUNDERSON:

Your Honor, we would

concur

with

i
^

j the

recommendation.

As

far

as

the

plea

in

abeyance,

i

3

j it's

always

been

my

feeling

to

that

and

position,

Your

Honor,

i

4

\ that

the

key

5

j f=ct

can

go

6

\ ce

probation

a

that

is

through

the

benefit

1 vS

legislature.

1 ^

impose

any

ccndition
THE

24

and

I

see

is
the

no

that

the

defendant

carry

out

what

with

intended

to

reason

be

why

it

wants

upon

the

no

record.

this
to

by

court

impose

would
To

conferred

in

me
the

cannot

as

a

probation.
Based

received

and

plea

will

impose

ccnditions

away

restrictions
of

fact

system,

come

COURT:

now

the

the

for

the

in

abeyance

following

the

plea

in

Number

one,

I'll

recommendation
agreement,

conditions

as

the

additional

abeyance.
require

that

court

the

1 • in s u c h

a way that
I

2 !
3 i others,
4

just

5

there

jail

heard

time

the c o u r t

and p a r t i c u l a r l y

previous

is n o t

to t h i s ,

is a d i f f e r e n c e

allowed

impose

sentencing

M r . G o c h i s , who was

although

I would

sentenced

point

in t h e two c a s e s .

on

out

In the

that

Gochis

i
;

6

I
i

case

there

would

be a r e s u l t i n g

class

A

conviction.

i

7 j In t h i s

case

8 | complies
9 i

there

with

will

the

THE COURT:

10 I to do i t , e v e n

Isn't

that

if he s e r v e d

equivalent
BOUWHUIS:

13 !

COURT:

14 I a g r e e m e n t .

by i t s e l f
what

To e n t e r

into

it's all over

reason

would

sentence?
To do t h e j a i l

No.

When

if he

conditions.

11 j t h e s a m e
MR.
12
THE

b e no c o n v i c t i o n

for him

otherwise

be

time?
a plea

he can c o m e

in

abeyance

away

with

i
15 ; no r e c o r d .
i
16 \ b e n e f i t .

There

is s t i l l

an o b v i o u s

incentive

or

|

17 |

MR.

BOUWHUIS:

That's

correct.

My

argument

is

j

18 j t h a t

the l e g i s l a t u r e

19 j a w a y

with

intended

two b e n e f i t s .

that

the d e f e n d a n t

O n e is no s e n t e n c e

be

come

imposed

I
20

and

the

second

21

that

from

22

I've

c i ted.
I

23 !
24 • submit
25

the

that

there

be no

first

paragraph

under

think

I've

my

made

I a at

conviction.
that

statute

argument.

that

I'll

it

THE

COURT:

Does

thff d e f e n d a n t

desire

to

address

1 j defendant
2 | jail.

serve up to one year

T note

in the Box Elder

that he has already

3 ; do not require

any specific

served

additional

County

8 2 days.

time

I

to be

!
!

4 i served.
As soon as he can be matriculated into an
i
i
5 | inpatient treatment p r o g r a m , I'll allow him to enter
6 ' that program.
i
7 j Drogram.

He must successfully

complete

the

If he flunks out of it and comes back

before

i

8 j the court, his plea in abeyance agreement will then go
j
9 j into effect in that he'll have a judgment on the plea.
t

10 j So you have

to complete

the

counseling

program.

i

11;

Once he completes

12 ; alcohol

counseling

13 : released

and

program,

suspend

that successfully,

an

I will allow him to be

the remaining

balance of the

jail

i

14 j time.
j

15|
i
16 ] surcharge

I'll

require

in the amount

MR. B O U W H U I S :

17

that he pay a fine
of

Excuse

and

S925.
me.

Would

that be mor-

!

18 j appropriately
L 9 i well,

that's

termed

an administrative

fee?

Let me

—

fine.

i

20 i

THE C O U R T :

I'm

not sure where you're going

with

21 j that•
22

MR. B O U W H U I S :

23 j

THE COURT:

24

must complete

25

any after

care

I'll

withdraw

All r i g h t .

the inpatient
that

that.

As I indicated
program

is required

to him. he

successfully

for a year

and

following

he'll have
convicted

to abide by all laws.
of any criminal

Do you understand

probation

offenses

during

Y e s , Your

Honor.

You and Mr. Bouwhuis

officer need

to get busy

and

understand, Mr. H u n s a k e r , that I'm
the problem.

could end up at the prison
MR. HUNSAKER:
Can we —

THE C O U R T :

to pay

I want you

trying

to

to design

If you flunk out, you

on this very

charge.
that.

fine now or in the event I

probation?
You will owe the fine.

pay it now, I expect you
will have

to find

Y e s , Your Honor, I realize

am I to pay this

flunk out on my

your

and start

out where you can get into a program.

this to address

probation.

that?

MR. HUNSAKER:
THE C O U R T :

You can't be

to pay it.

it during

If you

If you can't, you

the period

of your

proba t i on.
That's
MR. B O U W H U I S :

all.
Thank

Good
vou.

luck

can

to you.

ADDENDUM B

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION, AGREEMENT, AND
ORDER FOR PLEA IN
ABEYANCE

vs.

:
:
:
;

VAO BOYD HUNSAKER,

:

Case No.

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

6

"[S[£££1H^

:

Come now the parties hereto, the State of Utah through its
undersigned representative, and the defendant both personally and
through his undersigned attorney, and jointly request the Court
to accept a Plea in Abeyance in this matter, pursuant to the
terms and conditions specified herein, and, further, agree to the
terms and conditions specified herein regarding a Plea in
Abeyance:
1.

The defendant shall enter a plea of guilty to the

following charge or charges:
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A FELONY OF THE 3RD DEGREE, ON OR ABOUT
DECEMBER 6, 1995.
2.

The Court shall accept the defendant's plea of guilty,

but not enter judgment of conviction nor impose sentence, and all
time periods otherwise imposed by applicable law regarding the
time for entry of judgment or conviction against the defendant,
and the time to impose sentence upon the defendant are hereby
specifically waived.

3.

The defendant is represented by the undersigned attorney

and has been during negotiations for the Plea in Abeyance.
4.

The plea entered shall be held in abeyance for a period

of 3 6 months.
5.

The defendant specifically understands and agrees that

if, at any time prior to the expiration of the term during which
the plea is to be held in abeyance, the Court finds that the
defendant has failed to substantially comply with any term or
condition of the Judgment and Order entered in this matter, the
Court may then terminate the agreement and enter judgment of
conviction and impose sentence against the defendant for the
offense to which the original plea was entered.
6.

Upon the Court finding that the defendant has

successfully completed the terms and conditions of this Plea in
Abeyance Agreement, the Court shall dismiss the charge of
Aggravated Assault.
7.

The defendant shall be supervised by the Utah State

Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole Department,
as if the defendant were on Probation.
8.

The special terms and conditions of this Plea in

Abeyance Agreement, which shall be administered and supervised as
if the defendant were on Probation, are to be as later imposed by
the court following recommendations being received by the court
from the Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole.
9.

The parties understand and agree that the Court retains
2

jurisdiction to make such other and further orders, conditions,
and terms as it deems necessary.
DATED this 29th day of January, 1996.

3QYD JBBNS^KBR

^ 5 G^R^F / BARON
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
"-T4ICHAEL D. BOUWHUtS
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
APPROVAL AND ORDER
The Court, after reading and considering the above Motion
and Agreement for Plea in Abeyance, and having fully considered
the same, and good cause appearing therefore, hereby approves the
above Agreement, grants the Motion of the parties to accept the
Plea in Abeyance, and will enter its Order accordingly.
DATED this 29th day of January, 1996.
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ADDENDUM C

J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. (3340)
Assistant Utah Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Post Office Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone (801) 366-0180
Facsimile (801)366-0167
Counsel for Appellee

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

vs.

:

VAO BOYD HUNSAKER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL
Case No. 960234-CA

The State of Utah files this supplemental memorandum in response to this Court's
Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition dated 17 April 1996.
Judgment and Order. Since filing its memorandum on 24 April 1996, the State
has learned that a Judgment and Order on Plea Held in Abeyance was entered in this case
on 27 February 1996. A copy of this order was faxed to the Attorney General's Office on

25 April 1996 by the Clerk of the First District Court and is annexed, with fax cover sheet,
as exhibit A. No copy of this order was attached to the Docketing Statement, nor does
the Notice of Appeal mention it.
This order specifies the terms of the plea in abeyance. Paragraph 8 is of interest
because it dilutes the requirement of jail time: "The defendant shall serve 1 year in the Box
Elder County Jail with release to an inpatient program as soon as it can be arranged. The
remainder of the jail sentence shall be suspended upon successfully completing the
inpatient program."
Analysis. The State argues in Point One of the State's original memorandum that
this Court lacks jurisdiction because defendant is not appealing from a final order. The
order attached as exhibit A does not alter this analysis. Although styled "Judgment and
Order," this order is nevertheless not final for purposes of appeal. In criminal cases, "[i]t
is the sentence itself which constitutes a final judgment from which appellant has the right
to appeal." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1978); see also Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18a-1(1) (1995) (granting defendants a right of appeal from certain post-judgment
orders and incompetency orders). Defendant has not been sentenced; therefore, no final
order has been entered in this case. The appeal should be dismissed.
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